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A program document you may never hear about
(First in a series of quarterly commentaries by former  
program managers from the Naval Postgraduate School)
been there, done that
STRATCOM 
STRONG
Most of the time when people say, “Been there, done that,” 
they probably haven’t. To say that the former program 
managers who will be writing this new series of insightful 
columns have been there and done that is not a boast but an 
understatement. We at Army AL&T magazine marveled 
at our good fortune when the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS)—specifically Senior Lecturer John T. Dillard, COL, 
USA (Ret.), academic area chairman for systems acquisi-
tion management and himself a former program manager 
at multiple levels—approached us with the idea of a series 
of lessons-learned articles by former O-6 project managers 
who teach at NPS. 
This is the series’ inaugural article, food for both thought 
and action. We intend this series not to be quarterly state-
ments of fact, but quarterly conversation starters. Yes, these 
folks have been there and done that—but maybe you have, 
too. We hope you will feel free to raise your hand and jump 
right into the conversation. Please send us your feedback to 
continue the discussion.
The program is on schedule, under budget and meeting performance requirements—but terminated anyway! Government PMs—product, project and program managers 
alike—are responsible for cost, schedule and perfor-
mance of assigned programs. Well, sort of. Many external 
factors affecting programs are outside their control. 
These PMs operate in the center of a volatile, complex, 
uncertain and ambiguous system called “Big ‘A’ Defense 
Acquisition”—trying to navigate the requirements pro-
cess (Joint Capabilities and Integration Development 
System, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
Execution system, and the DOD Acquisition 5000 
series). If that weren’t enough, PMs get guidance from 
key stakeholders, such as senior service leaders and mem-
bers of Congress, as well as scrutiny from the media. In 
the end, having a program on schedule, under budget 
and meeting requirements may not be enough to deliver 
capability to the warfighter. 
by Dr. Robert F. Mortlock, COL, USA (Ret.)











What’s missing? For one thing, a strategic 
communications (STRATCOM) plan, 
which has proved to be invaluable to pro-
gram success.
OPTIONAL BUT ADVISABLE
You will not find “STRATCOM plan” 
listed as a required document at any pro-
gram milestone review. Nor do I propose 
that it be; too many unnecessary mile-
stone review documents are required 
already (a separate topic). However, a 
STRATCOM plan can serve a PM very 
well if approved by the service chain of 
command and used effectively. It  can 
be a synchronization tool for the entire 
Army staff, serving as an operations order 
(OPORD) for program implementation 
across the Army.
A STRATCOM plan is particularly 
useful for programs that affect all ser-
vice members (representing a high level 
of interest), have complex and multiple 
milestone decision authorities, and/or 
have high visibility with Congress and the 
media and a correspondingly high level of 
interest with service senior leaders. Two 
programs that fit this description are the 
Army’s physical fitness uniform and the 
camouflage effort for Army uniforms 
and equipment. 
In early 2012, the Army decided to 
upgrade its Soldier fitness uniform from 
the Improved Physical Fitness Uniform 
(IPFU) to the Army Physical Fitness 
Uniform (APFU). Soldiers were dissat-
isfied with the IPFU, which had been 
in use since the mid-1990s. The APFU 
program used extensive Soldier feedback 
(both surveys and testing) to improve 
the fitness uniform and implement the 
program in a cost-conscious way. 
For combat uniforms and equipment, the 
Army decided to adopt the operational 
camouflage pattern, which would provide 
Soldiers effective concealment during 
combat operations and prove to be a force 
protection combat multiplier across the 
modern battlefield. 
Both the APFU and the camouflage pro-
grams needed a synchronization tool, as 
their implementation was highly visible 
among Soldiers, senior leaders, Congress 
and the media at a time of sequestration 
and intense budget uncertainty. The last 
thing the Army wanted to do was make 
a uniform change not necessitated by 
Soldier feedback, not operationally rel-
evant, contrary to pending legislation or 
congressional intent, or with the poten-
tial to create a black eye in the media for 
the Army. 
Additionally, the camouflage effort 
crossed multiple chains of command 
because it affected both uniforms and 
equipment having no single milestone 
decision authority (MDA). Uniform 
changes are approved by the chief of staff 
of the Army (CSA)—and sometimes the 
secretary of the Army (SecArmy), if  there 
is intense congressional, public or media 
interest—after an approval recommenda-
tion from the Army Uniform Board. But 
camouflage also goes on organizational 
clothing and individual equipment, and 
each piece of Soldier kit (cold weather 
clothing, rucksacks, weapons, bags for 
night vision sights, etc.) may have a dif-
ferent program MDA—either a program 
executive officer (PEO) or the Army 
acquisition executive (AAE), depending 
on the acquisition category. 
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT
The operational camouflage pattern became available for purchase in select military clothing sales 
stores July 1, 2015. While camouflage goes on a wide variety of organizational clothing and 
individual equipment, each piece of which may have a different program MDA, there is no MDA 
for the pattern itself. As a result, many groups of people across multiple chains of command have 
a stake in the camouflage pattern, making a STRATCOM plan all the more advisable to help gain 
their buy-in. (Image courtesy of PEO Soldier)
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A FIXED REFERENCE POINT
Recognizing the need for a document to help synchronize the 
APFU and camouflage implementation efforts, the program 
management office wrote a STRATCOM plan for each effort in 
early 2013. Although coordinating review and approval of these 
documents through the Army staff was painful, it ultimately paid 
big dividends as the programs were questioned by Soldiers, senior 
leaders, Congress and the media. 
The STRATCOM plans that we used had the following sections: 
intent, background, environment, risks, target audience (primary 
and secondary), vulnerabilities and mitigation, execution, public 
affairs guidance, points of contact and enclosures (top-level mes-
sages, talking points, questions and answers, execution matrix, 
program support overview and information slides). This may seem 
like an overwhelmingly long document, but it certainly does not 
have to be. The base document we used was four pages long and 
the enclosures were another 10 pages. The program overview 
consisted of only seven slides describing the program.
Each document was signed and approved by the key stakehold-
ers from the user community, the Army staff through the CSA, 
the acquisition chain of authority through the AAE, and the 
SecArmy. 
Many times, senior leaders tried to “help” the efforts by add-
ing requirements, commenting on efforts or changing the 
implementation strategies. Each time, I, as the PM, referenced 
and shared the STRATCOM plan approved by the CSA and 
SecArmy. The plan proved tremendously useful to avoid require-
ments creep, budget cuts and schedule delays. Additionally, the 
STRATCOM plan was the only program document I had that 
contained a written “commander’s intent” clearly outlining the 
program vision and boundaries for me as a PM.
PMs can tailor a STRATCOM plan to their particular effort and 
use it as a “living” document to be updated when program “fact of 
life” changes necessitate it. 
CONCLUSION
I know: another document to write and staff … more oversight … 
less empowerment for the PM … more coordination. I under-
stand and empathize. The beauty here is that a STRATCOM 
plan is not required by statute or regulation. However, I highly 
recommend one for any program that has high visibility with 
Soldiers, senior leaders, Congress or the media, or any program 
that crosses MDA boundaries. 
You never know what external factors can derail programs, even 
those on schedule, within budget and meeting requirements. 
And right now, there is no program document that tells the pro-
gram’s story—that synchronizes the program’s implementation 
and execution plan across the service and provides the com-
mander’s intent succinctly—to serve as the program execution 
OPORD. The objective of the defense acquisition system is to 
get a capability in the hands of warfighters, and a STRATCOM 
plan can help a PM and the service do that more effectively. 
DR. ROBERT F. MORTLOCK, COL, USA (Ret.), managed 
defense systems development and acquisition efforts for the last 15 
of his 27 years in the U.S. Army, culminating in his assignment 
as the Project Manager for Soldier Protection and Individual 
Equipment in PEO Soldier. He retired in September 2015 and is 
now a lecturer for defense acquisition and program management 
in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He holds a Ph.D. in 
chemical engineering from the University of California, Berkeley, 
an MBA from Webster University, an M.S. in national resource 
strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and a B.S. 
in chemical engineering from Lehigh University.
THE OLD AND THE NEW
Black socks are now authorized for wear with both the traditional gray 
IPFU and the new (black and gold) APFU, worn here by a U.S. Army 
Alaska formation participating in an Army Birthday Run in June 2015 on 
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska. The APFU resulted from Soldier 
feedback. A good STRATCOM plan kept stakeholders on target and 
helped to prevent requirements creep. (Photo by Alejandro Pena, Joint 
Base Elmendorf-Richardson Public Affairs)
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